While regular and competitive elections are expected to lowerpolitical corruption by holding elected officials accountable fortheir actions, citizens often fail to vote corrupt officials out ofoffice in elections. This article explores how citizens’ perceptionsof political corruption influence their voting behavior by testingthree competing theories: nonvoting, opposition voting, andcorruption voting. This study also investigates the types of votersinvolved in each form of voting by considering three mediatingfactors: economic evaluation, partisanship, and education. Empiricalfindings from the South Korean case suggest that, in general, thehigh level of perceived corruption decreases voter turnout,confirming the nonvoting theory. Second, corruption votingoccurs mostly among those who positively evaluate the economyand have the same partisan affiliation as the incumbentcandidate. Finally, a high level of education leads to oppositionvoting. In sum, the empirical evidence confirms that incumbentcandidates’ and party’s political corruption does not always leadto the electoral victory of opposition parties and their candidatesbecause the mediating factors play a role in strengthening orweakening the patterns of nonvoting, opposition voting, andcorruption voting.