This paper examines the Suez Crisis with the prism of postwar Anglo-American relations, with major attention being given to the Anglo-American relations in regard to the Middle East. The British leaders knew that they would not solve the crisis by force alone without support, or acquiescence at least, of the United States, and that their counterparts in Washington would no way to accept the use of force. Nevertheless, they did what they had to do with a mind set in which whether or not they could get hold of traditional power of Great Britain. From the perspective of the United States, the Suez Crisis was the colonial fallout that the U.S. had to clean up. As long as the leaders in Washington viewed the development in the Middle East as a colonial question in essence, it was inevitable to anticipate that Britain and the United States would collide at some point. It was just a matter of when and where. The Suez Crisis was both climax and catharsis of Anglo-American uneasiness over the